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Understanding the peer review process could help research and shed light on the mech-
anisms that underlie crowdsourcing. In this paper, we present an agent-based model of
peer review built on three entities - the paper, the scientist and the conference. The
system is implemented on a BDI platform (Jason) that allows to define a rich model of
scoring, evaluating and selecting papers for conferences. Then, we propose a programme
committee update mechanism based on disagreement control that is able to remove
reviewers applying a strategy aimed to prevent papers better than their own to be ac-
cepted (“rational cheating”). We analyze a homogeneous scenario, where all conferences
aim to the same level of quality, and a heterogeneous scenario, in which conferences
request different qualities, showing how this affects the update mechanism proposed. We
also present a first step towards an empirical validation of our model that compares the
amount of disagreements found in real conferences with that obtained in our simulations.
Keywords: Artificial social systems; Peer Review; Agent-based simulation; Trust relia-
bility and reputation
1. Introduction
Large scale collaboration endeavors amongst humans are making the headlines of
scientific magazines and attracting the attention of the research community. The
cases of Wikipedia and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk are striking examples; some con-
sider these ICT-mediated collaborations to be the first step in a transition towards
collective intelligence [8, 38], a transition not devoid of risks as averaging effects [6]
and isolation [26]. To understand if and how this transition is happening and what
its consequences might be, we need to carefully examine the already existing social
and cultural structures that anticipate, in part or in whole, this kind of collabo-
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ration. The most important of these structures - a social artefact in itself - is the
complex social institution known as peer review.
Peer review, the process that scrutinizes scientific contributions before they are
made available to the community, lies at the core of the social organization of sci-
ence. Curiously, while the measurement of scientific production, that is, the process
that concerns the citation of papers - scientometrics - has been an extremely hot
research issue in the last years, we can’t say the same for what concerns the process
of selection of papers, although some attention has been focused on its shortcom-
ings. Indeed, the actual effectiveness of peer review in ensuring quality has yet to be
fully investigated. In [24], the review process is found to include a strong “lottery”
component, independent of editor and referee integrity. While the heterogeneous
review approach to a decision between two options is supported by Condorcet’s
jury theorema, if we move beyond simple accept/reject decisions the simplicity of
the solution disappears. A more sophisticated and precise outlook on peer review
that considers scoring, ranking, and reputation would tell a different story; in fact,
scoring has been shown to have non trivial effects on the reviewers’ choice (see
the marks distributions in [28]), rankings for citations have been shown to diverge
from rankings resulting from peer review [12], and theory and practice of reputa-
tion systems [15, 17] have been proposed as potentially transformative approaches
for traditional peer review. All these ideas could in turn help to detect kinds of
potential failures that are not waived by Condorcet’s theorem.
These issues are particularly relevant because peer review should take advantage
of the new information publishing approach and technologies created by Web 2.0 and
beyond. At the same time, diffuse dissatisfaction of scientists towards the current
mechanisms of peer review is perceived - anecdotally, as list of famous papers that
were initially rejected and striking fraudulent cases are published, and statistically,
as numerical evidence on the failures of peer review [28] is starting to appear.
Peer review is an open social system, that is made complex by the interactions
between its components and by role superposition - as an example, consider the
feedback that can be activated by the same people acting as authors and reviewers.
This complexity needs to be matched by a suitable modeling approach; peer re-
view appears to be amenable to study by numerical, agent-based models [25] , that
could be validated both on the micro and the macro level, and on which what-if
analysis could be performed, thus testing “in silico” proposed innovations. Solu-
tions should be searched through a federation of models, in a pluralistic modeling
approach [21]; in this paper, we propose one possible agent-based model of peer
review and, inspired by the introduction of rational cheaters in [39], we test how a
simple mechanism based on disagreement control could help controlling this kind
of cheating.
aThe theorem states how, roughly speaking, if independent voters on a decision can do even
slightly better than random, the more of them the better - thus supporting democratic approaches
to decision (even if the hypothesis of independence is rather unrealistic).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the liter-
ature on simulation of peer review. We then outline a general model of peer review
endowed with a reviewer disagreement control mechanism, with a few implementa-
tion details. In the results section, we show how the mechanism works under two
different conditions. In the last section, we present our conclusions and draw the
path for future work.
2. Related work
The idea of studying science using scientific methods is at the core of scientomet-
rics [32]. From the standpoint and for the purposes of scientometrics, science can
be defined as a social network of researchers that generate and validate a network
of knowledge. Hence, many scientometric studies have described the structure and
evolution of science, while a few others have aimed to replicate and predict the struc-
ture and dynamics of science. It is the latter group in which we locate this paper,
that can be classified as a quantitative predictive domain-specific computational
model.
Mathematical models have been proposed not only to explain statistical reg-
ularities [16], but also to model the spreading of ideas [19] and the competition
between scientific paradigms [36] and fields [7]. Furthermore, they have been used
to model the relation between publishing, referencing, and the emergence of new
topics [18], as well as the co-evolution of co-author and paper-citation networks
[9]. The model classes used for the mathematical modeling of science dynamics
cover stochastic and statistical models, system-dynamics approaches, agent-based
simulations, game-theoretic models, and complex-network models.
Many different conceptualizations of science are possible [10, 30] depending on
the goal and type of modeling performed. Models that conceptualize science as
a social activity will use researchers, teams, and invisible colleges as key social
terms. Models that simulate science as a knowledge network have to define knowl-
edge terms such as documents and journals. Models that place a central role on
the bibliographic data used in model validation require a definition of bibliographic
terms. Models that conceptualize science as an evolving system of co-author, paper-
citation, and other networks will need to define network terms. Given the impor-
tance of textual documents in the practice of science, our model focuses on the
quality assessment of papers produced by scholars.
Peer review is the principal mechanism for quality control in most scientific dis-
ciplines, as it determines not only what research results are published but also what
scientific research receives funding or what fellowships are granted, thus clearly in-
fluencing scientific career [4]. For many years the peer review process has been a
target for criticism in relation to traditional research criteria of: poor reliability,
as reviewers rarely agree on their recommendations; low fairness, as reviewer’s rec-
ommendations are frequently biased, that is, judgments are not based solely on
scientific merit, but are also influenced by personal attributes of the authors, appli-
December 26, 2012 12:27 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE acs-revision-
disagreement˙reviews-v2
4 F. Grimaldo, M. Paolucci
cants, or the reviewers themselves; and lack of predictive validity, because there is
little or no relationship between the reviewers’ judgments and the subsequent use-
fulness of the work to the scientific community. This paper deals with the problem
of reliability, also coined in other works as “the luck of the reviewer draw” [13],
as it faces the control of disagreements resulting from referees that follow a biased
review behavior.
Scientific merit is multifaceted and up to nine areas have been identified [5]
for the assessment of manuscripts and fellowships: relevance of contribution, writ-
ing/presentation, design/conception, method/statistics, discussion of results, refer-
ence to the literature and documentation, theory, author’s reputation/institutional
affiliation, and ethics. Although work dealing with the predictive validity of peer
review has questioned the validity of judgements prior to publication [34], is has
also pointed out the need for future peer review data to be analysed using multilevel
models (e.g. referee ratings for the quality of the proposals) with either categori-
cal or continuous response variables [22]. Following this latter point of view, our
research focuses on the ex-ante evaluation of the potential impacts of a paper, as
opposed to the ex-post process of counting citations for papers. In this scenario,
some research [1] has used beta distributions to describing the quality of a paper
regarding aspects such as: topic, technical quality and novelty. In our researh, we use
an aggregated quality value for each paper that allows us to model bias in the peer
review, present when factors that are independent of the quality of a submission
correlate statistically with the judgement of reviewers.
The relation of reviewers’ overall ratings and selection commitees’ final decisions
has been studied and different decision-making strategies have been analysed such
as: rejection when all reviewers recommend rejection, rejection when any reviewer
recommends rejection, and rejection when a majority of reviewers recommend re-
jection [33]. Many aspects of the peer review process vary case by case and this
variation largely depends on the type of application. For example: reviewers and
persons reviewed may or may not be anonymous (double-blind vs. single blind);
reviewers may be assigned permanently or temporaly, as well as they may represent
one scientific discipline or a variety of disciplines; a single reviewer or a commitee
may provide a peer review; etc. Accordingly, the peer review process should be ex-
amined with regard to so-called interaction effects, because attributes of the authors
or applicants and attributes of the reviewers are potential sources of bias in peer
review.
Nicola Payette’s [27] main premise is that science is some sort of distributed
cognitive system that can be reverse engineered (and hopefully optimized) using
agent-based models (ABMs). ABMs should then become part of the policy-makers
toolbox, as they enable us to challenge some idealizations and to capture a kind of
complexity that is not easily tackled using analytical models [32]. A striking example
of the possibilities of agent-based modelling of science is Gilbert’s model. Gilbert
started out with a simple agent-based model of a candidate mechanism for simulatin
Lotka’s law [23] pattern for the distribution of papers per author. While scientists
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played only a very small role in his first model, other researchers [37] have followed
a cognitive approach in which authors were not merely passive placeholders, but
cognitively capable individuals whose success or failure depends on their ability to
learn in the scientific world.
Recent work has shown that there is a quantitative, model-based way to select
among candidate peer-review systems [1]. It uses agent-based modelling to quan-
titatively study the effects of different alternatives on speed publication, quality
control, reviewers’ effort and authors’ impact. As a proof-of-concept, it contrasts
an implementation of the classical peer review system adopted by most journals, in
which authors decide the journal for their submissions, with a variation in which
editors can reject manuscripts without review and with a radically different sys-
tem in which journals bid on manuscripts for publication. Then, it shows that even
small modifications to the system can have large effects on these metrics, thus
clearly demonstrating that peer review is a very complex system that cannot be
fully described using simple models.
The work presented in this paper is inspired to the ideas in [39], where the
authors focus on an optimizing view of the reviewer for his or her own advantage.
To this purpose, they define a submission/review process that can be exploited by
a rational cheater [11] strategy in which the cheaters, acting as reviewers, reject
papers whose quality would be better than their own. In that model, the score
range for review is very limited (accept or reject) and in case of disagreement (not
unlikely because they allow only two reviewers per paper), the result is completely
random. They find out that a small number of rational cheaters quickly reduces the
process to random selection. The same model is expanded in [31], focusing not on
peer review of papers, but of funding requests. Only a limited amount of funding
is available, and the main focus is to find conditions in which a flooding strategy
is ineffective. The number of cheaters, differently from this study and from [39], is
not explored as an independent variable. However, similarly to the present work,
the strong dependence of results from the mechanism chosen (number of reviews,
unanimity) is evidenced.
In [20], the authors introduce a larger set of scores and use three reviewers for
paper; they analyze the effect of several left-skewed distributions of reviewing skill
on the quality of the review process. They also use a disagreement control method
for programme commitee (PC) update in order to improve the quality of papers as
resulting from the review process.
None of the models introduced above consider the reviewer effort as an important
factor. Instead, in [35] the authors study effort and its impact on referee reliability,
and in turn, on the quality and efficiency of the process. Their results emphasize
the importance of homogeneity of the scientific community and equal distribution
of the reviewing effort.
In this work, we will use the score range and programme commitee update
defined in [20], and we will apply it to control the effect of rational cheaters as
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presented in [39], adding also, partly inspired by [35], two different scenarios: ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous conferences.
3. The Peer Review Model
In this section we define the entities involved in the peer review process, we propose
a new model to reproduce its functioning and we present an agent-based implemen-
tation of this model.
3.1. Peer review entities
The key entities we identify within the peer review process are: the paper, the
scientist and the conference. We define them as follows:
• The paper entity is the basic unit of evaluation and it refers to any item subject
to evaluation through a peer review process, including papers but also, for ex-
ample, project proposals. We assume that the actual value of a paper is difficult
to ascertain and that it can only accessible through a procedure implying the
possibility of mistakes.
• Scientists write papers, submit them to conferences and review papers written by
others. Regarding paper creation, the value of a paper will depend on the writing
skills of the authors. The submission decision must consider aspects such as the
characteristics of the conference (e.g. acceptance rate), those of the authors (e.g.
risk taking), etc. Scientists will also be characterized by their reviewing skills,
that represent the chance they actually understand the paper they review, thus
being the primary cause of reviewing noise. The evaluation process might involve
other strategic behaviors possibly adopted by scientists, such as the competitor
eliminating strategy used by rational cheaters in [39].
• The conference entity refers to any evaluation process using a peer review ap-
proach. Hence, it covers most journal or conference selection processes as well as
the project evaluations conducted by funding agencies. Every paper submitted
to a conference is evaluated by a certain number of scientists that are part of
the programme committee (PC) of the conference. Thus, the conference is where
all the process comes together and a number of questions arise. For example,
since the number of evaluations a paper receives are just a few (three being a
typical case): can the review-conference system ensure quality in the face of vari-
able reviewing skills or strategic behaviors, thanks to some selection process of
PC composition that leans on disagreement control? The peer review model pre-
sented below is meant to tackle this kind of questions by concretising the different
issues introduced for the general entities presented above.
3.2. Proposed model
The proposed model represents the peer review problem by a tuple 〈S,C, P 〉, where
S is the set of scientists playing both the role of authors that write papers and
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the role of reviewers that participate in the PC of a set of conferences C. Papers P
produced by scientists have an associated value representing their intrinsic value,
and receive a review value from each reviewer. These values are expressed as integers
in an N -values ordered scale, from strong reject (value 1) to strong accept scores
(value N).
Every scientist s ∈ S is represented by a tuple of the form of Eq. 1.
s = 〈ap, aq, as, rs, rt, rd〉 (1)
Regarding paper production, each scientist has an associated author productiv-
ity ap, the number of papers uniformly written per year. Papers are of the form
p = 〈a, iv〉, being a ∈ S the author of the paper and iv ∈ {1, .., N} the intrinsic
value (quality) of the paper. This intrinsic value is calculated considering the author
quality aq ∈ {1, .., N} and the author skill value as ∈ [0, 1]. Whereas aq represents
the standard author quality, as represents the production reliability of the same.
Hence, scientists as authors write papers of value aq with probability as, and of
random value with probability (1− as) in order to produce, occasionally, some pa-
per with different quality with respect to their standard. Similarly, as a reviewer,
each scientist has an associated reviewer skill value rs ∈ [0, 1] as well as a reviewing
type rt ∈ {normal, rational}. Finally, the rd value measures the risk propensity
of the scientist, i.e., the inclination to send papers to conferences whose acceptance
values differ from their evaluation of their own papers.
In algorithm 1 we show the pseudocode carried out by scientists to review papers.
The if statement in line 1 models the noisy evaluation of papers, where the result of
reviewing is accurate with probability rs, and completely random with probability
(1− rs). Here, Random is a function providing a random float number in the range
[0, 1] whereas RandomInt returns a random integer in {1, .., N}. Furthermore, in line
7 we have incorporated the rational cheating strategy introduced in [39]. Hence,
rational cheaters punish those papers whose intrinsic value is greater than his own
author quality, thus trying to clear the way for his papers - preventing better papers
to appear and, for example, collect more citations than one’s own. It is worth
mentioning that the intrinsic value of a paper is not available to rational cheaters
(what could be seen as an un-realistic feature), but only an estimated value that
depends on their skill as reviewers.
Conferences c ∈ C are represented by a tuple of the form of Eq. 2.
c = 〈m,PC, rp, pr, av, I, dt, pu〉 (2)
Each conference is celebrated every year in a certain month m, in which it is-
sues a call for papers. In algorithm 2 we show the pseudocode executed by scientists
when deciding whether to submit a paper to a conference after having received its
call for papers. Note how the noisy evaluation of papers also occurs when evaluat-
ing one’s own papers in lines 2 - 6. Scientists decide whether to submit papers or
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode to review papers
Input: Paper Intrinsic Value (iv), Reviewer Skill (rs), Reviewer’s Author Qual-
ity (aq), Reviewing Type (rt)
Output: Review Value for the paper (reviewV alue)
1: if rs > Random() then
2: estimatedV alue← iv
3: else
4: estimatedV alue← RandomInt(1, N)
5: end if
6: if rt = rational then
7: if estimatedV alue < aq then
8: reviewV alue← estimatedV alue
9: else
10: reviewV alue← 1
11: end if
12: else
13: reviewV alue← estimatedV alue
14: end if
not in accordance with their risk propensity, which is expressed through the inte-
ger parameter rd. Hence, the submission happens when the distance between the
estimated paper value and the conference acceptance value av is less than or equal
to rd (see line 7).
Algorithm 2 Pseudocode to submit papers
Input: Available Papers (AP ), Reviewer Skill (rs), Risk Degree (rd), Confer-
ence (c), Conference Acceptance Value (av)
1: for all p such that p ∈ AP do
2: if rs > Random() then
3: estimatedV alue← iv
4: else
5: estimatedV alue← RandomInt(1, N)
6: end if
7: if |estimatedV alue− av| ≤ rd then
8: Submit(p, c)
9: end if
10: end for
Conferences employ a subset of scientists PC ⊆ S as their programme commit-
tee, whose size depends on the number of reviews requested per paper rp and the
number of reviews done per PC member pr. Then, they accept those papers whose
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average review value is greater than the acceptance value av.
Conferences also keep track of disagreements between reviewers, as they might
be a signal of low reviewer skill or cheating. One disagreement event is not enough
to find out which of the disagreeing parts is to blame. Thus, conferences maintain
an image i ∈ I of each scientist that has ever been a PC member, accounting for
the number of disagreements with the other reviewers. Images are of the form i =
〈s, nd, nr〉, where s is the scientist, nd is the accumulated number of disagreements
and nr is the total number of reviews carried out. Disagreements are calculated on
a paper basis as the difference between the review value given by the reviewer and
the average review value for that paper. When this difference gets higher than a
disagreement threshold dt, the reviewer disagreement count grows by one. The dt
parameter could also be fine-tuned for the detection of more sophisticated cheating
approaches.
Reviewer images are used to update the PC by discarding the pu percentage of
reviewers with the highest ratio nd/nr and selecting new ones from S. This way,
conferences perform a selection process which selects reviewers who provide similar
evaluations. Given our choice for reviewers’ mistakes (i.e. if they don’t understand
the paper, the evaluation is random), this mechanism should also select good re-
viewers.
In algorithm 3 we show the pseudocode executed when celebrating a new edition
of a conference. Firstly, function CallForPapers in line 3 broadcasts the conference
call for papers and receives papers submitted during a fixed period of time (cur-
rently, two months). Secondly, function UpdatePC in line 4 adjusts the PC to the
number of papers received as well as discards the pu% of reviewers with the worst
image. New members for the PC are selected randomly from the set of scientist
S. Thirdly, the for statement starting in line 5 is in charge of the evaluation pro-
cess: function AskForReviews returns the reviews from rp reviewers, different to
the author and randomly chosen from the PC, in the form of pairs [s, rV alue],
where s is the reviewer and rV alue is the grade given to the paper; function
ComputeAvgReview computes the average review value for the paper; lines 12 -
16 accept those papers over the acceptance value; and functions GetImage and
UpdateImage in lines 17 - 24 retrieve and update the image of the reviewers after
checking for disagreements. Finally, accept and reject notifications are sent to the
authors by functions NotifyAccepts and NotifyRejects.
3.3. Agent-based implementation
Some general characteristics of agent-based models (ABMs) make them well suited
to the modelling of the scientific process [32]. Heterogeneity states that agents
can differ from one another in as many ways as the parameter range for each of
their individual properties will allow. While this is something that would be very
hard to track with traditional analytical models, the computer makes it possible
to deal with a number of heterogeneous agents. Autonomy refers to the absence of
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Algorithm 3 Pseudocode to celebrate a conference
Input: Celebration Year (year), Conference Acceptance Value (av), Current Pro-
gramme Committee (PC), Current Scientists’ Images (I), Percentage of PC
update (pu), Scientists (S), Reviews Per Paper (rp), Papers Per Reviewer (pr),
Disagreement Threshold (dt)
Output: New Programme Committee (PC), New Scientists’ Images (I)
1: AccPapers← φ
2: RejPapers← φ
3: RcvPapers← CallForPapers(year, av)
4: PC ← UpdatePC(PC, S, I, pu, d|RcvPapers| ∗ rp/pre)
5: for all p such that p ∈ RcvPapers do
6: Reviews← AskForReviews(p, rp, PC)
7: sumOfReviews← 0
8: for all r = [s, rV alue] such that r ∈ Reviews do
9: sumOfReviews← sumOfReviews+ rV alue
10: end for
11: avgReviewV alue← sumOfReviews/|Reviews|
12: if avgReviewV alue ≥ av then
13: AccPapers← AccPapers ∪ {[p, avgReviewV alue]}
14: else
15: RejPapers← RejPapers ∪ {[p, avgReviewV alue]}
16: end if
17: for all r = [s, rV alue] such that r ∈ Reviews do
18: [nd, nr]← GetImage(I, s)
19: if |avgReviewV alue− rV alue| > dt then
20: I ← UpdateImage(I, s, nd+ 1, nr + 1)
21: else
22: I ← UpdateImage(I, s, nd, nr + 1)
23: end if
24: end for
25: end for
26: NotifyAccepts(AccPapers)
27: NotifyRejects(RejPapers)
central control. In the context of social simulation, this can be likened to a form of
methodological individualism: while institutions (and other macro-structures) can
set policies (rules, values, etc.) that will influence an agents behaviour, they are
not directly coordinating the agents or moving them around. At each time step in
a simulation, agents make their own decisions in order to achieve their individual
goals, possibly including some sort of individual and collective agent learning and
qualitative change, things that definitely happen in the peer-review world. Hence,
ABMs are concerned with the micro-level processes that give rise to observable,
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higher-level patterns. If an ABM can generate some macro-phenomenon of interest,
then it can at least be considered a candidate explanation for it.
In this paper we apply agent-based simulation as the modelling technique [2] to
represent the peer review process. With respect to statistical techniques employed
for example in [12] or [24], the agent-based or individual-based approach allows
us to model the process explicitly. In addition, it helps focusing on agents, their
interaction, and possibly also their special roles - consider for example the proposal
in [24] of increasing pre-screening of editors or editorial boards. Such a change is
based on trust in the fair performance of a few individuals who take up the editors
role. Thus, these individuals deserve detailed modeling, that could allow us to reason
on their goals and motivations [14].
The proposed peer review model has been implemented as a MAS (Multi-Agent
System) over Jason [3], which allows the definition of BDI agents using an extended
version of AgentSpeak(L) [29]. As depicted in figure 1, this MAS represents both
scientists and conferences as agents interacting in a common environment. The en-
vironment handles the clock system and maintains the agents’ belief base. As every
agent lives in its own thread, the system runs in a (simulated) continuous time.
Thus, agents can concurrently react to the passage of time by triggering different
plans such as that of writing new papers or celebrating a new edition of a confer-
ence. Communication between conferences and scientists take place within these
celebrations: conferences broadcast their call for papers, which cause scientist to
decide whether to submit their available papers; reviewers part of the PC are asked
for reviews of papers; and authors are notified about the acceptance or rejection of
candidate papers.
The implemented MAS is highly configurable; the number and characteristics of
both conferences and scientists can be independently set, following different statisti-
cal distributions (e.g. uniform, normal, beta...). Thus, the MAS can be configured to
run different simulations and evaluate the effects of the parameters in the proposed
peer review model.
4. Scenarios
In this section, we present the results of a set of simulations involving 1000 scientists
and 10 conferences across 50 years. Each scientist writes two papers per year (ap =
2), so that the overall production amounts to 2000 papers uniformly distributed
over the year.
Paper intrinsic values (quality) and review values are expressed as integers in a
10-values ordered scale, from one to ten. Author qualities (aq ∈ {1, .., 10}) follow
a (discretized) Beta distributionb with α = β = 5. We choose this shape, a bell
shaped curve with mean 5.5 and symmetrically distributed between one and ten, in
bThe beta distribution is the obvious choice for a statistic in a fixed interval as the one we are using
- the alternative being a normal distribution with cut tails, but that is just an approximation, and
much less flexible, for example, in terms of central value.
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Fig. 1. Overview of the MAS implementation.
the hypothesis that average papers are more common than either excellent or bogus
papers. Author skills (as) and reviewers skills (rs) follow a uniform distribution in
[0.5,1], that we consider a moderate level of noise in the production and evaluation
of papers. With respect to the reviewing type (rt), we show results with a mix
of regular reviewers and rational cheaters; in most of the cases, up to 30% of the
latter. We have performed simulations up to 90% of rational cheaters but, when
those become majority, the probability of having two over three cheating reviews
grows enough to turn the system upside down - PCs get filled with rational cheaters
and the whole system collapses, often ending up with no papers accepted at all.
Conference parameters have been set to reproduce two different experimental
scenarios that we call homogeneous condition and heterogenous condition. These
scenarios are a first step to understand the emergence of quality specialization in
the structure of workshops, conferences and papers. To this purpose, we compare
a system without specialization with one in which conferences differ in the quality
they request from a paper.
In the homogeneous condition (Hom) all the conferences act in the same way, as
they aim to accept papers whose quality is just above the average score (av = 5.5).
Scientists are then configured to submit papers to the first conference available after
the moment of production (their risk propensity being set to ten, rd = 10). In the
heterogeneous condition (Het) we have one conference for each acceptance value
from 1 to 10. In this way, we distinguish high-quality from low-quality conferences.
Scientists submit papers to a conference whose av differs, at most, one score from
the estimated paper value (rd = 1). For instance, a conference with av = 7 would
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only receive papers of estimated quality from six to eight. Conferences are scheduled
along the year so as to avoid conferences of similar acceptance value to appear next
to each other and reduce contention for the papers. We did this by selecting a
permutation p that maximizes Eq. 3.
10∑
i=1
10∑
j=i+1
|pi − pj |
min(|i− j|, |i− j +N |) (3)
Conferences in both the homogeneous condition and the heterogenous condition
ask for three reviews per paper (rp = 3) and each PC member carries out a max-
imum number of three reviews (pr = 3). The disagreement threshold is set to four
(dt = 4) and the percentage of PC members that are updated each year is ten
percent (pu = 10).
4.1. Results
Our research hypothesis is that the PC update mechanism proposed will effec-
tively find out and expel the rational cheater scientists. The argument that rational
cheaters will find themselves in disagreement with others every time they act strate-
gically makes sense and, in fact, in figure 2 we can observe how rationals decrease
substantially in the conditions where they are more abundant, up to an initial value
of 30%. The PC update mechanism results significantly more effective in the homo-
geneous condition than in the heterogeneous one (two-sided t test with p-value of
0.036 in 2050).
Note that for the homogeneous condition, averaging over conferences removes
little information, while in the heterogeneous one, where conferences differ in their
acceptance value, this averaging could hide information. We address heterogeneous
conferences individually in section 4.2.
Let us now focus on indicators showing the effectiveness of the rational cheating
strategy. The purpose of adopting a rational cheating strategy is to remove potential
competition from better authors and papers. Thus, the effect of rational cheaters
should be seen as an increase in the number of papers that should be accepted, but
end up being rejected. We call these “good papers rejected” (GPR). The opposite,
that is, the papers that should end up rejected but do not, are named as “bad
papers accepted” (BPA). Note that, although the definition is the same, the details
differ between the scenarios defined above. For example, a paper with quality seven
that gets a rejection is automatically a GPR in the homogeneous scenario whereas,
in the heterogeneous case, this depends on the acceptance value of the conference.
That is, if the conference has an acceptance value of nine the rejection is due and
the same paper would not count as a GPR.
Figures 3) and 4) respectively show the number of GPR and of BPA for the
scenarios considered in this paper. For the simulations starting with more rational
cheaters (Hom-30 and Het-30 in Figure 3), the decrease in the number of GPR,
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Fig. 2. Percentage of rational cheaters (RC) under homogeneous (Hom) and heterogeneous (Het)
conditions with initial percentages of ten and 30%, averaged over 10 conferences. The presence of
rational cheaters decreases in the first ten years, with the Hom scenario being more effective.
following the removal of rational cheaters from the PC, is already significant after
a few years (p-value of 0.02 between 2011 and 2015). However, notwithstanding the
very low quantity of rational cheaters at the end of the simulation (consider for
example the case of Hom-30), the total number of GPRs remains rather high.
With respect to the number of bad papers accepted, they remain rather stable
(see Figure 4), even though being at a lower absolute quantity with respect to the
GPR. Only in the Hom-0 condition they seem to decrease in time. But what is more
interesting is that the number of BPA at the onset of the simulation and during
the first years is inversely proportional to the quantity of rational cheaters at the
start. Thus, no rational cheaters bring more BPA than a 30% of rational cheaters,
and this is true for both scenarios.
In figure 5 we show the number of accepted papers, that grows in time for the
conditions with rational cheaters. As they are expelled from the PCs, the number
of accepted papers grows to approach that of conditions without rational cheaters.
This is likely to be happening also because of the reduction in the GPR (i.e. less
good papers rejected means more papers accepted).
What about quality? Is the removal of rational cheaters from the programme
committees going to make a difference in the quality of accepted papers? Surpris-
ingly, in figure 6, we can see that the removal of rational cheaters does not contribute
to higher average quality of papers. Only the Hom-30 condition shows an initial in-
crease in quality (two-sided t-test between 2011 and 2025 gives a p-value of 0.003).
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Fig. 3. Number of Good Papers Rejected (GPR) for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous sce-
narios, with initial percentages of rational cheaters from none to 30%. GPRs decrease significantly
for both conditions with 30% of rational cheaters. Compare with the removal of rational cheaters
from the PC in figure 2.
4.2. Looking at heterogeneous conferences
We now open up the box of heterogeneous conferences to see how they contribute
to the averages shown previously. From Figure 7 (left column), where we show
the percentage of rational cheaters for each individual conference (characterised by
an acceptance value), we see immediately how the PC update mechanism fails in
moving rational cheaters away from the PC when the quality of the conference is low.
If the acceptance value reaches 4 or lower, there is no decrease at all. This happens
due to the paper quality being too near to the lowest possible value used by rational
cheaters to prevent publication of competitive papers. Consider, for example, a
rational cheater with author quality six. Within a conference of quality eight, it will
act as a rational in all cases. But if that same agent ends in a PC for a conference
with acceptance value four, it will never act as a rational because rationals give fair
reviews to papers under their author quality. Thus, that conference feels no need
to drive it away from the PC.
This is also reflected in the quantity of good papers rejected (see the right column
of Figure 7). While low-level conferences reject very few papers, better conferences
let more GPR to slip away. Though, in these higher-quality conferences, there is a
decreasing trend in this kind of mistakes, slower for the acceptance values from four
to six, and faster for the better ones.
Finally, we examine the number of accepted papers per conference. As it was
foreseeable, more papers are accepted by mid-quality conferences, simply because
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Fig. 4. Number of Bad Papers Accepted (BPA) for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous sce-
narios, with initial percentages of rational cheaters from none to 30%. The number of BPA is
inversely proportional to the rate of rational cheaters at the start (for example, the difference
between Hom-30 and Hom-0 in 2011 is significant with p-value of 1 ∗ 10−5).
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Fig. 5. Number of Accepted Papers for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous scenarios, with
initial percentages of rational cheaters from none to 30%, averaged over ten runs. Conferences in
the heterogeneous scenario systematically accept more papers than in the homogeneous one.
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Fig. 6. Average paper quality for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous scenarios, with initial
percentages or rational cheaters from none to 30%. The quality remains constant notwithstanding
the removal of rational cheaters (as seen in 2). Only the Hom-30 condition shows an initial increase
in quality (two-sided t-test between 2011 and 2025 gives a p-value of 0.003).
our distribution of quality is chosen so that more papers of this kind are available.
The interesting part of figure 8 is the increasing trend that is distinguishable for
conferences with acceptance value greater or equal to five. The cause here, in ac-
cordance with the ratio of rational cheaters seen in figure 7, is the improvement of
PC quality thanks to the removal of rational scientist, that increases the number of
papers accepted, mainly through the decrease of unfair good papers rejected.
4.3. A step towards empirical validation
How much do reviewers disagree in the real world? In our idealized model, a rel-
atively long time span, in the order of ten to twenty years (see Fig. 2, is needed
to find out rational cheaters and to drive them off PCsc. To perform a meaningful
validation of our proposed mechanism, we would need data of comparable length
for a large enough number of conferences.
Regrettably, obtaining any kind of systematic peer review data has been a hur-
dle, not only for the authors of this paper, but even for financed EU projects in
the fieldd. We aimed for much less - that is, a qualitative validation obtained from
conferences that have been made accessible through personal connections of the au-
cIt should be considered that one of our “years” is just an instantiation of all conferences. In a
more active field, the cycle could be as short as one real time month
dJordi Sabater, LiquidPub project, personal communication.
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Fig. 7. Left: Percentage of rational cheaters in time, condition (Het-30) with ten conferences with
acceptance values from one (c01) to ten (c10). Conferences with higher acceptance values push
rational cheaters away faster. Right: Number of Good Papers Rejected (GPR) in time, condition
(Het-30) with ten conferences with acceptance values from one (c01) to ten (c10). Mid-quality and
high-quality conferences reduce GPR as they push rational cheaters away.
thors, whose names we hide for privacy reasons. While this set can not be considered
statistically representative, it adds realism to our work.
They amount to 13 small conferences or workshops for a total of 308 papers.
Disagreements, for the observed data, have been calculated rescaling the disagree-
ment threshold dt = 4, used in the simulation on a scale of N = 10 values, to the
scale of (in most cases, seven) values used by the conference (i.e. from strong reject
to strong accept). The number of disagreements per paper, over the whole set, is
about 0.11.
More in detail, in Table 1 we present a comparison between the amount of
disagreements per paper in actual conferences and in our simulated conferences.
While some of the conferences (those ranked C and B in the Computer Research
& Education (CORE) conference ranking available at http://core.edu.au/) seem to
occur in a high-agreement phase, other less prestigious ones show a disagreement
rate between 5% and 18%. For the first set of conferences, we could hypothesize
that the PC had been grown through processes like the one we have modelled, so
that the initial rate of rational cheaters has been eliminated. Of course, we can not
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Fig. 8. Number of accepted papers in time, condition (Het-30) with ten conferences with acceptance
values from one (c01) to ten (c10). Conferences with acceptance values over five increase the
number of papers accepted as a result of the expulsion of rational cheaters.
discern between this case and some consensus obtained through other mechanisms
(for example, lenient evaluations, as it has been shown in some reputation systems).
The second set of conferences (i.e. International, Summer School and National)
shows a disagreement ratio that can be placed neatly between the values produced
by our simulation. For space reasons, we only point out how the rate of disagree-
ment for summer schools is comparable to the initial simulated values for a 30%
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Table 1. Comparison of the percentage of disagreement found in real
conferences and that resulting from running the simulation scenarios
defined in section 4
Conference % Initial % Final % Disagreement
disagreements disagreements reduction
National 18.25 - -
Summer School 10.71 - -
International 5.41 - -
Intl. Core C 5.0 - -
Intl. Core B 0.0 - -
Hom-0%RC 4.3 2.9 32.6
Hom-10%RC 6.1 4.5 26.2
Hom-30%RC 11.9 5.6 52.9
Het-0%RC-LQ 4.7 3.6 23.4
Het-0%RC-MQ 3.4 1.7 50.0
Het-0%RC-HQ 4.2 3.8 9.5
Het-10%RC-LQ 9.4 4.2 55.3
Het-10%RC-MQ 8.6 5.5 36.1
Het-10%RC-HQ 5.2 2.4 53.9
Het-30%RC-LQ 46.0 11.8 74.4
Het-30%RC-MQ 16.0 6.1 61.9
Het-30%RC-HQ 3.9 2.8 28.2
Note: Hom-10%RC stands for homogenous condition with an initial
10% of rational cheaters in the PC. Het-10%RC-LQ stands for Hetero-
geneous condition with an initial 10% of rational cheaters in the PC.
Low-quality (LQ) conferences are those with acceptance values below
four, mid-quality (MQ) conferences have an acceptance value between
four and six and high-quality (HQ) conferences have acceptance values
greater than six.
of rational cheaters, while that of international conferences compares to the results
obtained for 10% of rational cheaters, or to those with 30% of rational cheaters
after the application of the reducing mechanism (that is, the percentage of final
disagreements). These results show how our model fairly reproduces the amount
of disagreements per paper found in actual conferences even if the simulation is
completely agnostic of the level of disagreement present in the list of reviews.
Finally, in Table 1 we also show how the proposed programme commitee up-
date mechanism is able to reduce the number of disagreements of the simulated
conferences in the course of the years. Reduction of disagreements is substantial in
the homogeneous case, ranging from 26.2% to 52.9%. Figure 9 gives a general idea
of what is happening in the simulation of this scenario. As the number of rational
cheaters in the PC decreases during the first ten years (see also Figure 2) so does the
total number of disagreements. It is worth mentioning that this amount is reduced
even though there are no cheaters in the PC (i.e. 0% of RC), since the proposed
programme commitee update mechanism also expels scientists with low reviewer
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Fig. 9. Total number of disagreements under the homogeneous condition with initial percentages
of ten and 30%, averaged over 10 conferences. The number of disagreements highly decreases in
the first ten years.
skills, thus selecting the best candidates. Under the heterogeneous condition, this
disagreement reduction ranges from a marginal 9.5% for the high quality branch
of heterogeneous conferences (since there are no cheaters in Het-0%RC-HQ, this
percentage is again due to the selection of scientists with a higher reviewer skill), to
the substantial 74% of the low quality branch of heterogeneous conferences starting
with a 30% of rational cheaters; thus showing how the simple PC update mechanism
proposed could be used to reduce the number of disagreements found in some real
conferences.
5. Conclusions and future work
This work highlights the importance of adopting more transparent and adaptive
policies for conference programme committees. Whereas PC formation is currently
more influenced by issues such as path dependency, inertia or self-selection, the
application of objective and independent criteria may be beneficial to the quality
of science.
Our results show how the mechanism introduced to control disagreement in the
PCs is also effective in removing most of the rational cheaters from the process.
The benefits can be measured in terms of the growing number of accepted papers
and of the decrease in the number of mistakes (good papers rejected).
When the quality of the conferences is homogeneous, rational cheaters are re-
duced but at the expenses of the number of accepted papers. It is important to note
that neither the homogeneity nor the heterogeneity of conferences determined the
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sharp transition to random selection shown in [39]. We hypothesise that this is due
to the fact that our model is based on a larger score range and three, instead than
two, reviewers.
A next step in this research would be to ground our model against data extracted
from higher-quality conferences as well as journals with an impact factor. However,
this data has proven surprisingly difficult to obtain. Not only our queries to the
owners of those systems went unanswered, but we knew that other researchers had
the same situation (none of [35, 39] managed to ground their assumption either).
The difference between the immediate availability of publication and citation data
is especially striking.
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